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Dimensions of the Out of Field: A Contemporary Reading of Deleuzian Cinematics

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Abstract

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze made one of his major contributions to visual studies with his books on cinema (1983–85). Deleuze's 'theory' of cinema and moving images, however, fell short of the digitalization of cinema, and the proliferation of moving images to every stratum of contemporary society through electronic means. We might ask ourselves to which extent Deleuzian cinematics can be applied in a contemporary context based on an ever-increasing flux of 'informatic' images. It is from this initial discrepancy between analogue and digital that this essay tries to create new concepts that can grasp the contemporary situation of the moving image within the information society.

This introduction will trace a line from Deleuzian concepts of cinema to a paradigmatic shift of contemporary visual culture, which it will in turn conceptualize as images that are 'plasmatic' and 'informatic': 'plasmatic' in the sense that they are no longer bound by a 'camera-consciousness' and 'informatic' in the sense that they are no longer the result of projection or exposure *inside* a camera. In the following I will use the concept of 'out of field' to cut up Deleuzian cinematics in order to explain and clarify key concepts and finally arrive at new concepts that are able to grasp contemporary image production.

In his two-volume study of moving images, *Cinema 1 and Cinema 2*, Gilles Deleuze divided cinema into a classical and a modern genealogy.[1] Central to this

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argument stands the concept of the 'out of field', which can be defined as the unseen six-vector space in front, behind and to the sides of any given picture.[2] It is with this key concept that Deleuze divides the continuity of classical cinema from the discontinuity of modern cinema, into 'movement-images' and 'time-images'. While the 'out of field' guaranteed the continuity of classical cinema, the loss of it in post-war cinema created the fragmentary space of modern cinema. This gave rise to two different modes of montage, on the one hand classical continuity defined by 'rational cuts', and on the other modern discontinuity defined by 'irrational cuts'.[3] In plain words, continuity will make us ask 'What is to be seen in the next image', while discontinuity on the other hand will make us ask 'What is to be seen in this image.'[4]

But what might define the status of the 'out of field' in a contemporary setting? It seems that there has been a reintegration of the 'out of field', borne out of a new montage in *depth* of the pixel plate, and furthermore that the pixel plate itself has supplanted the printed image of the negative.[5] This calls for a radical new concept in order to reassess Deleuzian cinematics, namely what I will define as a 'plasmatic' image. Deleuze refers to cinematic 'percepts' as either solid, fluid or gaseous, the latter constituting 'a cloud of camera eyes'. In contrast to this, the concept I will introduce as *plasmatic* percept is no longer bound to the idea of a 'camera eye', but can be manipulated without having to undergo exposure. That is to say that the power and intensity of the *plasmatic* image has to be seen as something that can no longer be determined by the concepts of cinema as institution. Deleuze himself stated as much in the conclusion of *Cinema 2*: 'The fact is that the new spiritual automatism and new psychological automata depend on an aesthetic before depending on technology. It is the time-image which calls for an original regime of images and signs before electronics spoils them or in contrast *relaunches* it.'[6]

It is interesting that Deleuze acknowledges that aesthetics will precede technology, and that the signs of an 'informatic' image might be found prior to the technology that would distribute it. In the following I will try to trace this development from a modern to a contemporary situation of the moving image. Through the work of Jean-Luc Godard and Andrej Tarkovsky I will trace this paradigmatic shift from analogue 'time-image' to digitized 'information-image'. It is in this sense that I will define a *plasmatic* 'information-image' that supplants 'the time-image' and reintegrates the 'out of field' into visual culture on a digital and electronic basis.

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The Out of Field

In the first and second chapters in his books on cinema Deleuze sets up the basic schemata for his conceptualization of the cinematic image. He does so in two steps: first, by problematizing movement as such in relation to commonsense space-time, and secondly, by setting up a slate of bipolar definitions of the cinematic frame. In this sense Deleuze tries to make a division between space as mere quantity and time as real quality. This division between measurable units and processes that change over time is central to Deleuzian thought on cinema. In this sense the cinematic frame constitutes the only accessible fragment of a variable whole. With Bergson's famous example of the irreducible process of sugar dissolving in water Deleuze points out the discrepancy between translation and transformations of points in space.[7] Deleuze uses this example to show us two fundamental characteristics of the frame: first, that it is always a part of a larger frame, and secondly, that there is always an outside which by virtue of its extension never can be included in a frame. It is, however, in my opinion and reading of Deleuze, important to remember that while even the most isolated frame is always associated with the extent of duration even through the smallest thread, the duration in itself has a tendency to form sets of frames. There is thus no question of a duality between frame and montage, but a flooding between them where specific modes of actualization can be operational.

Deleuze borrows the definition of the 'out of field' as a six-vector space from the film theorist Nöel Burch, but in his own right divides it into a virtual and actualized component: 'pragmatic' and 'absolute'. The pragmatic 'out of field' is simply that which is not present in the picture, but has a bearing on its reading; *the context of the image*. While the pragmatic 'out of field' might be seen as a fragment of an even greater frame, the absolute 'out of field' is that which owing to its size could never be included in any given frame. In this analysis of the frame as 'cut out' of an extensive duration, each frame is an excerpt of a greater context, and there exists furthermore an extent that radically exceeds this context. We understand, read and interact with this or that 'frame' because we already recognize or are familiar with the context of which it is an excerpt.

In the opening of the second volume of the *Cinema* books Deleuze argues that the circuit between action and reaction, which held the continuity of classical cinema together, has been torn apart and replaced by another circuit, namely the circuit between actual and virtual. The senso-motoric schemata of pre-war cinema can no longer function as a motor in the distribution of images, since there is no longer any action that can be taken in a meaningful way, and imagery has been degraded to a 'circulation of clichés'. This situation has to do with the collapse of the 'out of field', since without it no external reference or milieu for action can be

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described. Instead we have 'optical' and 'sonic' material oscillating between actual and virtual in a variety of 'mirror images'. The ambiguity of image and reflected image is the circuit that will drive modern cinematic narrative. This new 'motor' of the proliferation of images can be exemplified with a scene from Orson Welles' *The Lady from Shanghai* (1947): When the showdown in the mirrored hall of the abandoned fairground ends with a bullet shattering the mirrors and revealing the sordid facts, the movie itself ends, since its motor has stopped.

With the advent of the *Nouvelle Vague* of the 1960s there 'is no more Out of field', only optical and sonic signs intersecting in 'irrational cuts'.[8] It is precisely these irrational cuts that will confuse the reading of a given frame, since the frame can no longer be read as an excerpt of a greater context, what Deleuze would describe as the pragmatic 'out of field'. In this sense it is important to delve into the concept of irrational montage as expressed in the work of Jean-Luc Godard, and its importance for Deleuzian thought.

Deleuze and Godard

In Deleuzian cinematics the writings and works of film director Jean-Luc Godard play a significant role.[9] But the relationship runs deeper, not only in the cascade of references on Godard in the cinema books, which helps to sew Deleuze's argument together, but even more so in the relation between Godard's early period and Deleuze's series of monographs on philosophy. Godard's project was to rewrite the history of cinema by reassessing a variety of genres, from musical to science fiction, and supplementing them with the masterpieces that they lacked by producing them himself. In a sense this is exactly the same strategy that Deleuze applied in his works on great thinkers in which he, in his own words, 'made children on them, that they could never have imagined themselves'. The irrational cut, exemplified in Godard's work, is seen by Deleuze as a pure difference of cinema, a new 'stammering' of the image, as in the jump-cuts of *A bout de souffle* (1959) or the discontinuity of image and sound in *Deux ou trois choses que je sais d'elle* (1967). We might, however, also understand this stammering as a novel mode of counting: 'first, second, third', instead of 'one, two, three'. With Godard in hand Deleuze will do away with Aristotelian rationality by starting to count in a new mode. Godard states it like this in a short fragment written in connection with *Deux ou trois choses que je sais d'elle*: 'If Cinema= Life, then 1 + 2 + 3 = 4.'[10] What Godard is pursuing here is the limits of rationality as expressed in the additive principle of 1 + 2 = 3. In this sense we leave the idea of unity for the advent of description; a cascade of 'and + and + and …', ever rewriting and recombining its own schemata and logic:

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> Philosophy, Deleuze argues, has usually taken this path, grounding all relations (AND, BECAUSE, OR) on being (IS). A second transcendental path, rarely explored by philosophy, would be to think the externality of relations. If there is no being that determines relations, if each relation is produced on the basis of each new encounter, then all we have are connections and relations without prior ground: a series of 'ANDS' with no 'IS'.[11]

This is to say that if cinema is to portray life or have any claim to relevance, it must proceed in the manner of 'and + and + and + …' by making cinematic 'language' stammer. In practice this means that one has to create a maximum of difference between two cuts, which will in turn result in the fact that a given cinematic image will be read discontinuously as neither an excerpt of a greater whole nor a link in a causal chain. This new 'stammering' of the image, where any external referent has fallen away, is at the core of Deleuzian cinematics[12] and is the basis of the concept of the 'time-image'. This concept, however, presupposes that montage, and especially irrational montage, is the privileged expression of cinematic time.

Mirrors and Chronotopes

In Deleuzian cinematics the work of Andrej Tarkovsky plays a more minor role than that of Godard, though Tarkovsky himself in his book *Sculpting in Time* (1986) put forward a variety of related concepts such as 'pressure of time', 'cinematic figure' and a typology of the image.[13] When Deleuze accidently treats Tarkovsky as a practitioner of a minor 'film language', it has some bearing on Tarkovsky's initial rejection of montage. Deleuze must, for the sake of argument, reject Tarkovsky's central concept, namely that the 'pressure of time' in the single continuous shot is the basis of cinema. On the other hand one might read the famous opening scene of Tarkovsky's *Mirror* (1974) as one long refutation of montage, since Tarkovsky duplicates every form of irrational cut with a tracking shot that achieves the same effect without cutting. He achieves this by means of removing a piece of physical space or an object on the film set, instead of removing a piece of time at the comfort of the editing table. In my view, this is evident in the way the sleeping child in the hammock 'disappears', or the male protagonist gets 'caught' on the wrong side of the symmetry axis in a tracking shot. In this sense it is a highly influential scene in the history of cinema which takes on the relevance of modern cinematic grammar by showing that montage is not the sole expression of cinema.

In this sense *Mirror* is a cinematic singularity, almost a 'minor cinema', in the way it rejects montage as a major difference of cinema. Tarkovsky incessantly

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distributes spatial and temporal markers in order to create a meta-instability of Cartesian space.[14] Something weird or warped may happen to our commonsense understanding of daily life, but with Tarkovsky an 'explanation' will always follow. An example might be the 'missing' child in the hammock, who we rediscover some minutes later as having just risen from the ground where it [he or she?] had been sleeping in a wooden box lined with hay all the time. What Tarkovsky does is simply to use rational cuts when he wants us to identify with the plot (what is next?), and irrational cuts when he wants us to experience change and process (what is there to see?). I will refer to this practice of 'operational montage' as a specific mode of editing apart from continuity editing or irrational cuts. This leads to a pragmatic form of montage which in its furthest dimension would look at rational cuts as spatial markers and irrational cuts as temporal markers. This practice of operational montage has a bearing on the 'fragmented' space of modern cinema. When Tarkovsky makes the very final tracking shot in *Mirror*, we are faced with a novel topological space-time, since his mother as a young woman and his real old mother are depicted in the same shot, standing in the same landscape. In order to fully understand the scope of Tarkovsky's work, it is important to realize that even though these two individuals are gathered in the same piece of cinematic space-time (the shot) they are never to be identified within the same image (frame). That is to say, both women are depicted in the same shot, but never seen in the image at the same time, since Tarkovsky will strive to bend the rules of Cartesian space-time rather than break them. We may therefore say that Tarkovsky has moved beyond the Deleuzian problematic of quantity (space) and quality (time), always realizing that the spatiality of the Cartesian coordinate system is simply the interface with which we communicate: 'It is a kind of equation, signifying the correlation between truth and the human consciousness, bound as the latter is by Euclidian space.'[15]

We might take this analysis further by recalling the two final shots of Tarkovsky's *Nostalghia* (1983), where we are first presented with an uncut shot of a man traversing a pond with a candle, and then with the famous collage of the Russian dacha inside the ruins of a medieval church. While the first scene is taken with no cuts whatsoever, the second scene is evidently the superimposition of an Italian cathedral sheltering a landscape with a small Russian house. The first scene is evident of what Tarkovsky calls 'pressure of time', while the second is strangely out of proportion: Either the church is too small or the dacha too big. In the first scene we witness the reinsertion of meaningful, though 'local', action into cinema, but in the second scene we witness the occurrence of a whole new type of montage: the montage in *depth* of the image. It is these three elements – the local meaningful action, the deformation of Cartesian space within the frame and the collage in depth of the picture plane – that will herald the reintegration of the 'out of field' in cinema

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and visual culture as such.

On Volume and Information Images

In order to clarify what I will define as 'volume' and 'information-images' it seems relevant to summarize some of the preceding concepts in a contemporary context, while referring to Deleuzian cinematics in a more casual manner. First of all we must realize that digital pictures, from electronic information tablets to screen savers and software interfaces, are in fact animations – that is, moving images. These images can achieve a 'plasmatic' level, in which they leave the Deleuzian concept of percepts (solid, fluid, gaseous) behind and constitute a reintegration of the 'out of field'. These new 'images', however, might not have the form of cinema, although they could. The concept of 'operational montage', defined as a pragmatic use of rational and irrational cuts in order to describe either geography or process, might not be an exclusively cinematic activity. Actually, we do this every day ourselves on the internet, and we call it *surfing*. The concept of 'operational montage' as such can certainly be found in cinema: experiments with the dramaturgical model by New Hollywood as in Jonze and Kaufmann's *Adaptation* (2002) and the incorporation of Hitchcockian doctrines in feature-length documentaries as in Burstein and Bretts' *The Kid Stays in the Picture* (2002). But it might also be found in the ever-increasing array of new television series that shop happily around in the toolbox of the modernism of cinema or in related tendencies in installation and video art.[16] The point, however, is different here. If we accept the suggestion that a phenomenon as YouTube is de facto an intensive multiplicity[17] and works by the principle of 'operational montage', we might find in Deleuze's writings a concept that bears on this situation, namely the 'volume-image'. Already in the opening of the books on cinema Deleuze has mentioned the 'volume-image', ranking it among the other forms of the 'time-image', though he never bothers to define the concept.[18] However, in an interview with the magazine *Cinéma*, Deleuze commented on this elusive concept: 'The brain is a space-time volume – the role of art is to trace new paths in it.'[19]

So the 'volume-image', riding the crest between rationality and irrationality, might take cinematic shape, but it might also be seen in a variety of other guises. For, in the 'volume-image', it is no longer the classical situation of an *actant* who acts, nor the modern situation of an agent who sees, as Deleuze would have it; but as I see it, the 'volume-image' depicts the contemporary situation of a *producer* who *produces*.

This collapse of the producer–spectator relationship has been discussed in a number of ways, from Altman's *The Player* (1992) to a variety of self-made

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documentaries and reality formats, in which the characters also produce the production wherein they are situated themselves. But this tendency has spilled over and become fully actualized, so that when I am surfing the 'volume-image' of YouTube, I am constantly making new paths in an ever-changing and ever-accumulating intensive multiplicity. That is to say, I produce ratings on YouTube while surfing, I create new paths or guide others there, and I might ultimately delete or create new material in this ever-growing multiplicity. This gives the 'volume-image' a new status, since it can never be determined by a discursive regime, quantification or 'history'. The imaginary intensity and dynamics of a volume-image like YouTube will on the other hand start to make its own subterfuge discourse by maiming, lying, stealing, distributing. As Patricia Pisters has commented on Deleuzian percepts and affects:

> If we work with Deleuze's concepts, it becomes clear that a camera consciousness has entered our 'normal' perception, making it easier to jump between layers of time and to become confused in time. It is a consciousness that is nonpersonal and 'detached' from a preconceived idea of the subject. It forms material and temporal aspects of subjectivity. Images surround us; we live in images and images live in us. [...] The brain is itself an image. The brain is the screen.[20]

In this sense, the 'volume-image', operating on the principle of operational montage, might still be seen as a variant of the Deleuzian concept of the 'time-image'. However, when we turn ourselves to the concept of the 'informatic-image' and the reintegration of the 'out of field', we must leave Deleuzian concepts behind. There is not only a difference in degree between 'time-image' and 'informatic-image', but a difference in kind. This is so, because we are no longer dealing with a 'camera consciousness', nor are we dealing with an image that is projected on to a negative or pixel plate, but rather with an image that can record itself without any form of projection. In this sense, the 'out of field' of the new 'informatic-image' is exactly that which can never be recorded on a pixel plate, that which is *not* reducible to an image. What we saw with the advent of Tarkovsky is that the camera eye gives way to a montage in *depth* of the picture. This picture might be recorded by a physical camera, and then again it might not. The new image consists solely of a set of pixels on an imaginary plate that can be manipulated individually without having to be 'exposed' in a physical camera. In this sense, the new image is *plasmatic*, owing to the fact that it can fuse 'non-localizable' temporal relations with the Cartesian space of the frame. The common space-time coordinates of the image will be deformed, but only for a while. In a sense this is a resurrection of the 'movement-image', but in a new dimension, since it is now able to account for the temporal dimensions that shattered classical cinema. If we speculate to what extent this new image has

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a 'pragmatic' and 'absolute' 'out of field', we might state it in the following way: the pragmatic 'out of field' would be the virtuality of everything that could appear, has already appeared, is appearing on the pixel plate, whereas the absolute 'out of field' would be that which could never appear as the product of any manipulation of pixels on a plate: wind, world, flesh. In a sense this might be a return to the *chiasm* of Merleau Ponty: the world is *not* an image.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the tracing of the concept of the 'out of field' has presented us with a novel grasp of Deleuzian cinematics. The 'out of field' held the Cartesian space-time of classical cinema together, while the loss of it in post-war cinema made this structure collapse and gave us a cinema based on irrational cuts and false continuity. The end of cinema has not yet occurred, but cinema has mutated in a number of ways, creating cinematic phenomena that are not exclusive to the cinema as institution. This development can be seen in what I have defined as 'volume-images', which are characterized by a montage in *depth* of the frame and an operational montage in *length*, oscillating between rational and irrational cuts in a montage of operations. Furthermore, an 'informatic-image' exists, which is characterized by its independence from the camera as recording device. Informatic images are characterized through their state of being 'plasmatic' rather than fluid, solid or scattered in a cloud, owing to the fact that they are no longer part of a 'camera consciousness'. This image is radical in essence, since it no longer refers back to cinematic institutions but works on the principle of an open-ended appropriation of new image material.

Evidently, this re-evaluation of Deleuzian cinematics relies heavily on the thought of Deleuze himself. I might name the 'smallest thread' of Bergson, tying frame and duration together, or I might refer to the 'Method of Intuition' as the way I have chosen to 'cut up' Deleuze by his own means of operation. Ultimately I might refer to the standpoint that the power in Deleuze's thought lies in the creative act of giving birth to new concepts. How is that possible, one might argue, given that Deleuzian cinematics only refer to the cinema as institution and to the philosophical debate on the nature of the image? It is by taking it as a well-defined continuum of cinematic history that has been cut out from its domain in order to qualify and experiment with a philosophical discourse. In this sense one might view this re-evaluation of Deleuzian cinematics as a form of violence to thought, in order to bring about two fundamental insights: all contemporary production of moving images, from mobile displays to your everyday PowerPoint, is in fact animation; and this production has been liberated from its privileged place inside the camera.

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As Deleuze gives way to his famous quotation of Spinoza, 'We do not yet know what a body can do',[21] we could retort: 'neither what a *pixel* can do!'

Notes

1 G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (London: Continuum, 2005) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (London: Continuum, 2005).

2 'Up, Down, Left, Right, In Front and Behind of the Frame'; [is this a title?] N. Burch, *Theory of Film Practice* (New Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 17–31.

3 The rational cut belongs to either what was before or what comes after, while the irrational cut is defined as an interstice belonging to neither. Deleuze draws on the phenomenologist Albert Spaier who describes two different ways to make a cut in continuity; Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 46, 303–04.

4 Deleuze characterizes the shift from 'movement-image' to 'time-image' as a shift from *actant* to *agent*: 'But he has gained in an ability to see what he has lost in action or reaction: He SEES, so that the viewer's problem becomes: "What is there to see in the image?" (and not now "What are we going to see in the next image?")'; Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 261.

5 The projected film, in classical film technology, is always a printed positive of the negative 'original' that has been exposed in the camera.

6 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 256.

7 'The glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar's melting in the water are abstractions and that the whole within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses, it may be, in the manner of consciousness.' [is this accurate?] H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (New York: Dover, 1998), 10.

8 Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 174–75.

9 As Raymond Bellour has put it with regard to the cinema books of Deleuze and Jean-Luc Godard's *Histoire(s) du cinéma* (1988–98), it is curious that two such key figures of visual culture should undertake a history of cinema at the very moment when such a project is no longer possible: 'There again is an attempt at history: how to grasp cinema as a whole at a moment when the history of cinema, as a global object has become something impossible'; R. Bellour, 'Thinking, Recounting. The Cinema of Gilles Deleuze', in G. Genosko (ed.), *Deleuze and Guattari: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Vol. 1* (London: Routledge, 2001), 103.

10 'I: "Objective description" Through objective descriptions of (a) objects (b) subjects. II: "Subjective description" Through subjective descriptions of (a) subjects (b) objects. III: "Search for structure" given as 1+2=3, the addition of first and second layer in a selection or "complex". IV: "Life", given as: If Cinema= Life, then 1+2+3=4, the continuous combination of descriptions and complexes which the aim to establish a singular existence'; J.-L. Godard, 'My Approach in four Movements', in T. Milne (ed.), *Godard on Godard* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972), 239.

11 C. Colebrook, *Deleuze, A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2006), 77–79.

12 It is not only a concept of Deleuzian thought on cinema, but a motif that guides his thought in a variety of scenarios from the books on Kafka and Proust to the seminal *A Thousand Plateaux*.

13 A. Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986).

14 Cartesian space is defined by three spatial vectors (X, Y, Z) that can be understood as height, width, depth and supplemented with a mechanical and segmented time (hours, minutes, seconds).

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15 Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*, 106.

16 D. Birnbaum, *Chronology* (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2005).

17 Colebrook describes an intensive multiplicity with the following analogy: 'If one takes one stone out of a box of stones the remaining stones stay the same, and stay as stones. My memory is intensive because each past event alters the present, and each future event will alter how I relate to my past; matter is extensive because it does not synthesize or connect its differences'; Colebrook, *Deleuze*, 77.

18 'Now we are equipped to understand the profound thesis of the first chapter of Matter and Memory: (1) there are not only instantaneous images, that is immobile sections of movement; (2) there are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; (3) there are finally, time images, that is duration-images, change images, relation-images, volume-images which are beyond movement itself'; Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 12.

19 G. Deleuze: 'L'Image-Temps' (1985), in Forhandlinger (Frederiksberg: Det lille forlag, 2006), 77. [Not in bibliography]

20 P. Pisters: *The Matrix of Visual Culture* (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2003), 218–19. Pisters is paraphrasing Deleuze in an interview with *Cahiers du cinéma*: 'The brain is unity. The brain is the screen', *Cahiers du cinéma*, 380 (February 1986), 25–32.

21 G. Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 225–26.

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